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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Consider a planner who has to choose which one of two mutually exclusive treatments should be
assigned to members of a population. One treatment is the status quo, whose eﬀects are well known.
The other is a promising innovation, whose exact eﬀects have yet to be determined. The treatments
in question may be, for example, two alternative drugs or therapies for a medical condition, or
two diﬀerent unemployment assistance programs. Suppose that a randomized clinical trial or
experiment will be conducted and its results will be used to choose which treatment population
members will receive.
The planner faces two problems. First, she has to know what experiment (in particular, what
sample size) should be chosen to get a suﬃciently accurate estimate of the treatment eﬀect. Second,
she has to select how treatment choices will be determined based on the statistical evidence obtained
from the experiment. Often, treatment choice is based on the results of a statistical hypothesis
test, which is constructed to keep the probability of mistakenly assigning an inferior innovation (a
Type I error) below a speciﬁed level (usually .05 or .01). Then, the sample size is selected to obtain
a high probability (usually .8 or .9) that the innovation will be chosen if its positive eﬀect exceeds
some value of interest.
Following Wald’s (1950) formulation of statistical decision theory, I analyze the performance
of alternative statistical methods based on their expected welfare over diﬀerent realizations of the
sampling process, rather than just their probabilities of error. In particular, I continue a recent
line of work advocating and investigating treatment choice procedures that minimize maximum
regret by Manski (2004, 2005, 2007, 2009), Hirano and Porter (2009), Stoye (2007a, 2007b, 2009a)
and Schlag (2007). Regret is the diﬀerence between the maximum welfare that could be achieved
given full knowledge of the eﬀects of both treatments (by assigning the treatment that is actually
better) and the expected welfare of treatment choices based on experimental outcomes. The latter
is smaller, because experimental outcomes generally do not allow the decision maker to choose the
best treatment 100 percent of the time.
This paper’s main departure from previous literature on the subject is asymmetric consideration
of Type I regret (due to mistakenly using an inferior new treatment) and Type II regret (due to
missing out on using a superior innovation). The persistent use in treatment choice problems of
2the hypothesis testing approach, which allows Type II errors to occur with higher probability than
Type I errors, suggests that many decision makers want to place the burden of proof on the new
treatment. Most do so by selecting a low hypothesis test level, such as  = 05. It is not clear
what principles, besides convention, are there to guide the selection of hypothesis test level for the
circumstances of a particular decision problem. Values of maximum Type I and maximum Type II
regret of a statistical procedure could provide the decision maker with more relevant characteristics
of its performance than the traditional hypothesis testing measures (test level and power), since
regret takes into account both the probability of making an error and its economic magnitude.
The asymmetric minimax regret criterion proposed here combines minimax regret with a kinked
linear welfare function that is intended to capture the policy maker’s loss aversion. Maximum Type
II regret of asymmetric minimax regret solutions is larger than their maximum Type I regret by
a given factor. When treatment eﬀect estimates are normally distributed, hypothesis testing rules
with a given level  correspond to asymmetric minimax regret solutions for some asymmetry
factor  () for any sample size and variance. It turns out, however, that extreme degrees of
loss-aversion are needed to obtain treatment choice rules corresponding to hypothesis tests with
standard signiﬁcance levels.
Instead of looking at maximum regret values, a Bayesian decision maker would assert a subjec-
tive probability distribution over the set of feasible treatment outcome distributions, use sample
realizations to derive an updated posterior probability distribution, and maximize expected wel-
fare with regard to that posterior distribution (which is equivalent to minimizing expected regret).
Unfortunately, in many situations decision makers do not have any information that would form
a reasonable basis for asserting a prior distribution. In group decision making, members of the
group may disagree in their prior beliefs. These problems lead to frequent use of conventional prior
distributions in applied Bayesian analysis. Bayesian treatment choice based on a conventional prior
distribution, rather than on a subjective distribution reﬂecting the decision maker’s prior informa-
tion, does not have a clear economic justiﬁcation. Decision making based on maximum regret is a
conservative approach to dealing with the lack of reasonable prior beliefs, since maximum regret is
the sharp upper bound on expected regret for decision makers with any prior distributions.
The paper proceeds in the following order. Section 2 exposits the decision-theoretic formulation
of the problem and introduces the asymmetric minimax regret criterion. In section 3, I consider a
3simple but instructive case where the experiment generates a normally distributed random variable
with known or bounded variance. I analyze conventional treatment choice rules based on hypothesis
testing and sample size choice based on power analysis in light of their maximum regret. Section 4
analyzes treatment choice in a more practically applicable setting with binary or bounded random
treatment outcomes. Exact mimimax regret results were obtained for these problems by Stoye
(2009a) and Schlag (2007). I extend their results to derive asymmetric minimax regret solutions
u s i n gad i ﬀerent technique. I also demonstrate that minimax regret solutions proposed by these
authors for bounded outcomes could be suboptimal if the decision maker can place an informative
upper bound on the variance of the outcome distribution, which is the case in many applications.
In section 5, I discuss the use of approximations, bounds, and numerical methods for problems
that do not have convenient analytical solutions and illustrate their performance in a hypothetical
clinical trial problem with rare dangerous side eﬀects. All proofs are collected in an appendix.
2 Statistical treatment rules, welfare and regret
The basic setting is the same as in Manski (2004, 2005). The planner’s problem is to assign members
of a large population to one of two available treatments  ∈  = {01}.L e t  =0denote the
status quo treatment and  =1the innovation. Each member  of the population, denoted ,h a sa
response function  () describing that individual’s potential outcome under each treatment .T h e
population is a probability space (Ω) and the probability distribution  [(·)] of the random
function (·) describes treatment response across the population. The population is "large," in the
sense that  is uncountable and  ()=0 ∈ .
The planner does not know the probability distribution , but knows that it belongs to a set
of feasible treatment response distributions {∈ Γ}.  will be called the state of the world.I
assume that average treatment outcomes  [()] are ﬁnite for all  and .
All population members are observationally identical to the planner, thus the planner’s treat-
ment assignment decision can be fully described by an action  ∈  =[ 0 1],w h e r e denotes
the proportion of the target population assigned by the planner to the innovative treatment  =1 .
Proportion 1 − , then, is assigned to the status quo treatment  =0 . I assume that fractional
treatment assignment (0 1) is carried out randomly.
4I consider planners whose welfare from taking action  in state of the world  is the average
treatment outcome across the population:
 () ≡ (1 − ) ·  [(0)] +  ·  [(1)]
=  [(0)] +  · .
The second line expresses the welfare function in terms of the average treatment eﬀect
 ≡  [(1)] −  [(0)],
which is the primary population statistic of interest to the planner.
The planner conducts an experiment and observes its outcome — a random vector  ∈ X.T h e
probability distribution of  depends on the unknown state of the world  and will be denoted
by . A (random) function  mapping feasible experimental outcomes from X into actions from
 will be called a statistical treatment rule (or simply a decision rule). The action chosen by a
planner with statistical treatment rule  when  is observed will be denoted by  ().T h es e to f
all such functions (feasible statistical treatment rules) will be labeled D.
I follow Wald’s (1950) approach and evaluate alternative statistical treatment rules based on the
expected welfare they yield across repeated samples in each state of the world . If the planner’s
welfare function is  (), then the expected welfare from using statistical treatment rule  in




 ( ()) (1)
=  [(0)] +  [ ()],
where  [()] denotes
R
∈X  ().
Statistical treatment rule 2 dominates 1 if  (2) ≥  (1) for all  ∈ Γ with strict
inequality at least for one value of . Statistical treatment rule 1 is said to be admissible if there
does not exist any 2 ∈ D that dominates 1, otherwise 1 is called inadmissible.
The analysis of this paper is based on a normalization of the expected welfare called regret.
5The regret of statistical treatment rule  is the diﬀerence between the highest expected welfare
achievable by any feasible statistical treatment rule in state of the world  and the expected welfare








The highest welfare in state of the world  is achieved by statistical treatment rule ∗
 ()=
1|  0| that selects the optimal (in state ) treatment regardless of experimental outcomes. The










 · (1 −  [ ()]) if   0
− ·  [ ()] if  ≤ 0.
The regret of a statistical treatment rule, thus, is the product of the probability of making an error
(assigning an individual to the wrong treatment) and the magnitude of the welfare loss suﬀered
from that error.
2.1 Treatment choice based on hypothesis testing
The most common framework used for treatment choice between a status quo treatment and an
innovation is hypothesis testing. Typically, the researcher poses two mutually exclusive statistical
hypotheses — a null hypothesis 0 :  ≤ 0 that the innovation is no better than the status quo
treatment, and an alternative hypothesis 1 :   0 that the innovation is superior. If the null
hypothesis is rejected, then treatment  =1is assigned to the population. If it is not rejected, the
status quo treatment  =0is assigned.
Rejecting the null hypothesis when it is, in fact, true (assigning an inferior innovation  =1
to the population) is called a Type I error. Not rejecting the null hypothesis when it is, in fact,
false (assigning the status quo treatment instead of the superior innovation) is called a Type II
error. Hypothesis testing procedures are designed to have a certain signiﬁcance level,w h i c hi st h e
probability of making a Type I error (the maximum probability over states of the world  that fall
under the null hypothesis). The signiﬁcance level (also called - l e v e l )i su s u a l l ys e ta tc o n v e n t i o n a l
values  =0 05 or  =0 01.
6The probability of not making a Type II error (assigning an innovation when it is superior to
the status quo treatment) is called the power of the test. The power of the test is usually calculated
for some speciﬁcv a l u e¯   0. The sample size of an experiment is selected so that a hypothesis
test with a chosen signiﬁcance level would have the desired power (typically 8 or 9)a t¯ .
2.2 Treatment choice based on maximum regret
Savage (1951) introduced the criterion of minimizing maximum diﬀerence between potential and
realized welfare (now called regret) in a review of Wald (1950) as a clariﬁcation of Wald’s minimax










A planner who accepts the minimax regret criterion should select a statistical treatment rule
that satisﬁes





and select a sample size such that the maximum regret max
∈Γ
() is acceptable. Axiomatic
properties of minimax regret were ﬁrst studied by Milnor (1954) and more recently by Hayashi
(2008) and Stoye (2009b).
2.3 Asymmetric reference-dependent welfare
As a way to express the planner’s desire to place the burden of proof on the innovation, I will also
consider asymmetric reference-dependent welfare functions. For an asymmetry coeﬃcient 0,
let the welfare function () be linear in the average treatment outcomes with the same slope
as  above the reference point  [(0)] and a  times steeper slope below the reference point.
7Formally, deﬁne () as:




( () −  [(0)]) if  ()   [(0)],
 · ( () −  [(0)]) if  () ≤  [(0)],




 ·  if   0,
 ·  if  ≤ 0.




() ( ()) (4)




 [()] if   0,
 ·  [ ()] if  ≤ 0.
Ordinal relationships between expected welfare of two statistical decision rules do not depend on
the asymmetry factor 0.F o ra n y12 ∈ D and  ∈ Γ :
 (2) T  (1) ⇐⇒ () (2) T () (1).
Thus, the set of admissible statistical treatment rules is the same for all asymmetrical linear welfare
functions (4) and for the standard linear welfare (1).
The regret function for expected welfare (4) equals











 · (1 −  [ ()]) if   0





() if   0
() if  ≤ 0.
The only diﬀerence between this regret function and the regret function for standard linear welfare
(2) is the factor  for  ≤ 0. Maximum regret under the asymmetrical welfare function can be
8expressed through the regret function for linear welfare as
max
∈Γ
() () = max
¡




¯   () ≡ max
:≤0
()
is the maximum Type I regret (maximum regret across states of the world in which the innovation
is inferior) under the linear welfare function and
¯  () ≡ max
:0
()
is the maximum Type II regret (maximum regret across states of the world in which the innovation
is superior). The names Type I and Type II regret are given in analogy to Type I and Type II
errors in hypothesis testing. Type I regret is the welfare loss due to Type I errors, while Type II
regret is the welfare loss due to Type II errors under the null hypothesis 0 :  ≤ 0.
Since the asymmetry factor  does not aﬀect admissibility, I will only consider asymmetrical





 · ¯   () ¯  ()
¢
for the linear expected welfare (1). In problem (5) the planner gives  times greater weight to
regret from Type I errors.
3S i m p l e n o r m a l e x p e r i m e n t
Iw i l lﬁrst consider a very simple experiment whose outcome  ∈ R is a scalar normally distributed
random variable with unknown mean  ∈ R and known variance 2:
 ∼ N(2).
9While  is a scalar, it need not originate from an experiment with sample size one. For example, 
could be a sample average  = 1

P
=1  of  independent random observations. If observations





,t h e n is a suﬃcient statistic for (1)
with variance 2 =
2
0
 . Comparing single normal draw experiments with diﬀerent values of , then,
is equivalent to comparing experiments with diﬀerent sample sizes.
More importantly, the probability distribution of many commonly used statistical estimators of








0). Then the asymptotic distribution of ˆ  is said to be N(
2
0
 ). Heuristically, studying
experiments with a single normally distributed outcome for diﬀerent values of  will suggest what
eﬀect diﬀerent types of decision rules and sample sizes have on regret in more general settings.
It follows from the results of Karlin and Rubin (1956, Theorem 1) that if the distribution of 
exhibits the monotone likelihood ratio property (which is true for normal and binomial distribu-
tions) and the welfare function is (1), then the class of monotone decision rules
() ≡
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1 
 =   ∈ [01] ∈ R,
0 





in all states of the world). Since the probability of observing  =  equals zero for the normal
distribution, it follows that a smaller class of threshold decision rules
() ≡ 1| | ∈ R
is also essentially complete. Thus, considering other rules is not necessary in this problem.











if   0,





if  ≤ 0,
10which is the probability of making an incorrect decision multiplied by ||, the magnitude of the
loss incurred from the mistake. Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Maximum Type I and Type II regret equal




































The right-hand equalities are derived by substituting  =

 . These functions have ﬁnite pos-
itive values for every  ∈ R.S i n c e ()=(−−),i tf o l l o w st h a t¯  ()=
¯   (−). Lemma 1 shows that the decision maker faces a trade oﬀ between maximum Type
I and maximum Type II regret. Higher threshold values imply lower Type I regret, but necessarily
higher Type II regret.
Lemma 1 a) ¯   () is a continuous, strictly decreasing function of 
lim
→−∞
¯   ()=∞ and lim
→∞
¯   ()=0 
b) ¯  () is a continuous, strictly increasing function of ,
lim
→−∞
¯  ()=0and lim
→∞
¯  ()=∞
Figure 1 displays the maximum Type I and maximum Type II regret as functions of the decision




¡ ¯   () ¯  ()
¢
is minimized when ¯   ()= ¯  (), which happens
only at  =0 . The minimax regret treatment rule in this problem is 0. This is sometimes called
the plug-in rule (a plug-in rule takes the estimated value of the average treatment eﬀect and assigns
treatments as if it were the true value).
Similarly, the minimax regret statistical treatment rule under asymmetric welfare function
() is uniquely characterized by the equation
 · ¯   ()= ¯  ().
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Asymmetric Max Type I regret, K=3
Maximum Type II regret
Figure 1: Maximum Type I and Type II regret as functions of the decision rule threshold.
























Hypothesis test rule (α=.05)
Figure 2: Regret functions of minimax regret and hypothesis test based decision rules.




















Since only one value of 
 solves the equation for a given , the threshold of the minimax regret
statistical treatment rule is proportional to .
A conventional one-sided hypothesis test with signiﬁcance level  rejects the null hypothesis
( ≤ 0) and assigns the innovative treatment if  Φ−1 (1 − ). This critical value guarantees
that the probability of a Type I error does not exceed  for any  ≤ 0.S i n c e
−






















≤ 1 − Φ
¡
Φ−1 (1 − )
¢
= 
The statistical treatment rule based on results of a hypothesis test with level  is a threshold rule
()with threshold  () ≡ Φ−1 (1 − ). For a given test level ,t h et h r e s h o l d is proportional
to the standard error . Thus a hypothesis test based treatment rule can be rationalized as a




{Φ( () − )}
max
≤0











{−Φ( − Φ−1 (1 − ))}
.
 () is the ratio of maximum Type II to maximum Type I regret of the hypothesis test based
decision rule, which depends only on the test level . In this normal model, the correspondence
between a hypothesis test based rule with level  and an asymmetric minimax regret rule with level
 () does not depend on the standard error of , and thus on sample size. This feature is speciﬁc
to the normal example. For example, if  is a binomial variable, then hypothesis test based rules
with the same level correspond to diﬀerent asymmetric minimax regret treatment rules for diﬀerent
sample sizes.
Table 1 provides maximum Type I and II regret values and the asymmetry factors corresponding
13Test signiﬁcance level Threshold Max Type I regret Max Type II regret  ()
 = 5 (minimax regret)  =0 17 17 1
 = 25  = 6745 0608 3724 6125
 = 1  =1 282 01877 6409 3415
 = 05  =1 645 008178 8371 1024
 = 025  =1 96 003665 1026 2799
 = 01  =2 326 001304 1264 9696
Table 1: Maximum Type I and Type II regret of statistical treatment rules induced by hypothesis
tests based on a normally distributed estimate with variance 2.
to commonly used hypothesis test levels. Decision rules based on the one-sided  = 05 level
hypothesis test minimize maximum regret for decision makers who place 102 times greater weight
on Type I regret than on Type II regret. Decision rules based on  = 01 level tests are minimax
regret for decision makers who place nearly 970 times greater weight on Type I regret. The trade
oﬀ between Type I and Type II regret is markedly diﬀerent from the trade oﬀ between raw Type
I and Type II error rates (an  = 05 level test has a 95% maximum probability of Type II error,
which is 19 times higher than the maximum probability of the test’s Type I error).
Figure 2 compares the regret functions of the minimax regret treatment rule 0 and the treat-
ment rule (05) induced by a hypothesis test with signiﬁcance level  = 05 over a range of feasible
values of . The scale of both axes is normalized by . The maximum regret of the hypothesis
test rule is approximately 837 which is nearly ﬁve times higher than the maximum regret of the
minimax regret treatment rule (approximately 17) . T h eh y p o t h e s i st e s tr u l eh a sl o w e rr e g r e t
over  ≤ 0, but it can only achieve it by greatly increasing the regret for   0. The greatest
expected welfare losses from using a hypothesis test rule occur when the innovative treatment is
moderately eﬀective.
3 . 1 S a m p l es i z es e l e c t i o n
I will illustrate sample size selection based on maximum regret by comparing it with one of the
conventional methods. The International Conference on Harmonisation formulated "Guideline E9:
Statistical Principles for Clinical Trials" (1998), adopted by the US Food and Drug Administra-
tion and the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products. The guideline provides
researchers with the values of Type I and Type II errors typically used for hypothesis testing and
sample size selection in clinical trials. For hypothesis testing, the limit on the probability of Type
14I errors is traditionally set at 5% or less. The trial sample size is typically selected to limit the
probability of Type II errors to 10-20% for a minimal value of the treatment eﬀect that is deemed
to have "clinical relevance" or at the anticipated value of the eﬀect of the innovative treatment.
Suppose that a researcher considers bearable the loss of public welfare due to a 10% probability
that her innovative treatment could be rejected if its actual treatment eﬀect equals ¯ 0.F o l l o w i n g
the convention, she selects the sample size for which the variance of  equals ¯ 2,w h e r e¯ 2 satisﬁes
the condition that  will fall under the 5% hypothesis test threshold  (05) = ¯ Φ−1 (95) with
probability 10% if  = ¯ :

¡
















The value of regret that the researcher ﬁnds acceptable at  = ¯  thus equals 1¯ . This procedure
d o e sn o tm a k ea p p a r e n tt ot h er e s e a r c h e rt h a tam u c hl a r g e rw e l f a r el o s sw i l lb es u ﬀered at a twice
smaller value of  =1 46¯  ≈ 5¯ , where the regret function achieves its maximum of 837¯  = 286¯ .
Consider now how the sample size would diﬀer if it were selected by the researcher with an
explicit objective that maximum regret should equal 1¯  in two scenarios. First, suppose that the
researcher planning the experiment has to take for granted that the decision making will be carried
out using a 5% hypothesis test rule. SInce its maximum regret equals 837, she would select
sample size such that





1 · 2926¯ 
837
= 35¯ ,
which implies sample size that is over 8 times larger than the one selected by power calculations in
the example above. In a second scenario, suppose that the researcher has control over treatment
assignment and plans to use the minimax regret decision rule 0. Since the maximum regret of the
15minimax regret decision rule equals 17, the sample size should be such that
17 = 1¯ 
 =1 722¯ ,
which implies sample size that is almost 3 times smaller than the one selected by power calculations.
3.2 Normally distributed outcomes with unknown variance
So far in this section I have assumed that the planner knows the variance of the normally distributed
average treatment eﬀect estimate . Suppose now, instead, that the data (1) consists of
 independent normally distributed observations with unknown mean  and unknown variance
2
. Let the set of feasible states of the world be
Γ ≡
©





where 2  0 and ¯ 2  ∞ and let
¯ Γ ≡
©
 :  ∈ R2
 =¯ 2ª









 − ¯ 
¢2 t h es a m p l ev a r i a n c e .I ti sw e l lk n o w n
(cf. Berger, 1985) that the pair
¡ ¯ 2¢
is a suﬃcient statistic for (1),t h u so n l yd e c i s i o n
rules that are functions of ¯  and 2 need to be considered. It turns out, however, that decision
rules satisfying criteria based on maximum Type I and Type II regret could often be found within
a smaller class of threshold decision rules that depend only on the sample mean ¯ .
Proposition 2 Let  ≡ 1
¯ ¯ ¯ 















≥∗ { · Φ(∗ − )}
then











b) there is no statistical treatment rule 0 ¡ ¯ 2¢
that has both lower maximum Type I regret and
lower maximum Type II regret than .
Condition (7) ensures that the threshold decision attains maximum Type I and maximum Type
II regret on the subset ¯ Γ.I fi ti sn o ts a t i s ﬁed, the maximum Type I or maximum Type II regret of
 could be higher on the set Γ than on ¯ Γ, then there maybe exists a non-threshold decision rule
that has both lower Type I and lower Type II regret than .
It follows from Proposition 2 that threshold decision rules that satisfy minimax regret or asym-
metric minimax regret criteria for outcomes with ﬁxed variance (set of feasible states of the world
¯ Γ) also satisfy the corresponding criteria for outcomes with bounded variance (set of feasible states
Γ) if their threshold values satisfy condition (7). The range of thresholds for which condition (7)
holds depends on the ratio ¯ 
.F o r¯ 
 =1 ,i th o l d si f|| ≤ 125 ¯  √
. In the opposite extreme case
when ¯ 
 →∞(meaning  → 0)i th o l d si f|| ≤ 22 ¯  √
. In particular, since a threshold rule with
 =0is the symmetric minimax regret decision rule in the problem with known variance, it also
minimizes maximum regret in the problem with unknown variance.
4 Exact statistical treatment rules for binary and bounded out-
comes
Exact solutions to the minimax regret problems and exact maximum regret values are available
when the data  consists of  independent random outcomes of treatment  =1 , provided that
the outcomes are binary or have bounded values. I will ﬁrst consider the case of binary outcomes
and then its extension to outcomes with bounded values.
174.1 Binary outcomes
Let the treatment outcomes of the innovative treatment  =1be binary, w.l.o.g. let (1) ∈ {01},
and let the known average outcome of the status quo treatment  =0equal 0 ≡  [(0)] ∈ (01).
Let the set of feasible probability distributions of (1) be a set of Bernoulli distribution with
means  ∈ [] 0 ≤  0 ≤ 1 (if 0 is outside of the interval [], then the treatment
choice problem is trivial). The experimental data consists of  independent random outcomes
(1), each having a Bernoulli distribution with mean . The sum of outcomes  =
P
=1 
has a binomial distributi o nw i t hp a r a m e t e r s and .  is a suﬃcient statistic for (1),
so it is suﬃcient to consider statistical treatment rules that are functions of .
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 ∈ {0}∈ [01]
are admissible and form an essentially complete class, thus it is suﬃcient to consider only monotone
rules. The regret of a monotone rule  equals
( )=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨


















if  ≤ 0,
where  () denotes the binomial probability density function with parameters  and 
and  ≡  − 0.
It will be convenient to use a one-dimensional index for monotone rules () ≡  +(1− ).
There is a one to one correspondence between index values  ∈ [0+1]and the set of all distinct
monotone decision rules.  =0corresponds to the decision rule that assigns all population members
to the innovation, no matter what the experimental outcomes are.  =  +1corresponds to the
most conservative decision rule that always assigns the status quo treatment.
Lemma 3 establishes properties of maximum Type I and Type II regret of monotone statistical
18treatment rules for binomially distributed  that lead to simple characterisations of minimax
regret and asymmetric minimax regret treatment rules. As before, maximum Type I regret is
¯   () ≡ max
:∈[0]
() and maximum Type II regret is ¯  () ≡ max
:∈(0]
().
Lemma 3 If  has a binomial distribution, then
a) ¯   () is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of () with ¯   ()=0for
()= +1 .
b) ¯  () is a continuous and strictly increasing function of () with ¯  ()=0for
()=0 .
It follows from lemma 3 that there is a unique value of () such that ¯   ()=
¯  ().  is the minimax regret treatment rule. While its characterisation is implicit,
monotonicity and continuity of the maximum Type I and Type II regret as functions of () makes
computation very straightforward. The same characterisation of the minimax regret treatment rule
for  ∈ [01] was derived in Stoye (2009a) using game theoretic methods.













() is the minimax regret statistical treatment rule for asymmetric reference dependent welfare
function ().
The following proposition derives the exact large sample limit of maximum regret of minimax
regret statistical treatment rules. Unlike in the normal case covered in Section 3, the minimax
regret rule in the Bernoulli case does not generally coincide with the plug-in rule:
 ≡ 1




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
In large samples, however, the diﬀerence between  and  has little eﬀect on maximum regret.
Proposition 4 shows that as sample size grows, the maximum regret of minimax regret rules and
plug-in rules (normalized by
√
) converge to the same limit. That limit is the same as minimax
regret in a problem with  normally distributed outcomes with ﬁxed variance 0 (1 − 0).
Proposition 4 Asymptotic maximum regret of both minimax regret and plug-in statistical treat-



















Now consider a more general setting. Let the outcomes of treatment  =1be bounded variables
(1) ∈ [01].L e t 0 ≡  [(0)] ∈ (01) denote the known average treatment outcome of the
status quo treatment  =0 .L e t {∈ Γ} be the set of probability distributions  [(1)] that
the planner considers feasible. Assume that  [(1)] ∈ []0 ≤  0 ≤ 1.A l s o , l e t
{∈ Γ} denote the set of all Bernoulli distributions with  [(1)] ∈ [] and assume that
Γ ⊂ Γ. The technique outlined below relies on including all the Bernoulli distributions in the
feasible set.
Schlag (2007) proposed an elegant technique, which he calls the binomial average, that extends
statistical treatment rules deﬁned for samples of Bernoulli outcomes to samples of bounded out-
comes. The resulting statistical treatment rules inherit important properties of their Bernoulli
ancestors. Let  : {0} → [01] be a statistical treatment rule deﬁned for the sum of  i.i.d.
Bernoulli distributed outcomes (as in the previous subsection). Let  =( 1) be an i.i.d.
sample of bounded random variables with unknown distribution  [(1)] and let  =( 1)
be a sample of i.i.d. uniform (01) random variables independent of . Then the binomial average
extension of  is deﬁned as
¯  () ≡ 
µX
=0 1[ ≤ ]
¶
.
Verbally, this extension can be described as a simple process:
a) randomly replace each bounded observation  ∈ [01] with a Bernoulli observation ˜  =1with
probability  and with ˜  =0with probability 1 − ,
b) apply statistical treatment rule  to (˜ 1 ˜ ).
The random variables 1[ ≤ ] =0  are i.i.d. Bernoulli with expectation  [(1)],
thus
P
=0 1[ ≤ ] has a Binomial distribution with parameters  and  [(1)]. For any state
of the world ,l e t¯  be the state of the world in which ¯  [(1)] is a Bernoulli distribution with
t h es a m em e a n [(1)].T h e n(˜ )=¯  () and (˜ )=(¯ ). The regret of a binomial
20average treatment rule ˜  in state of the world  i st h es a m ea st h er e g r e to f in a Bernoulli state of
the world ¯  with the same mean treatment outcomes. It follows that maximum Type I (II) regret
of ˜  in the problem with bounded outcomes ( ∈ Γ) is equal to maximum Type I (II) regret of  in
the problem with Bernoulli outcomes ( ∈ Γ).
If statistical treatment rule  satisﬁes some decision criterion based on maximum Type I and
m a x i m u mT y p eI Ir e g r e tf o rt h ef e a s i b l es e to fB e r n oulli outcome distributions, then its binomial
average extension ˜  satisﬁes the same criterion for the feasible set of bounded outcome distributions.
Suppose, for example, that  minimizes maximum regret for Bernoulli distributions. Suppose
there was a treatment rule ˜ 
0
for bounded distributions that had lower maximum regret than ˜ .
Then 0 would have to have lower maximum regret over Γ than , which would imply that 
does not minimize maximum regret for the problem with Bernoulli distributions.
Binomial average extension yields exact minimax regret and asymmetric minimax regret sta-
tistical treatment rules if the set of feasible outcome distributions Γ includes the set of Bernoulli
outcome distributions with the same means Γ. In many applications, however, the planner knows
that Bernoulli outcome distributions are not feasible. If the outcome variable is annual income
of a participant in a job training program, the planner may assume not only that the variable is
bounded, but also that it’s variance is much smaller than the variance of a Bernoulli distribution
with the same mean. If Bernoulli outcome distributions are excluded, then binomial average based
treatment rules may not be optimal. The following proposition shows that a plug-in statistical
treatment rule
 ≡ 1






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
has lower asymptotic maximum regret than a binomial average extension of ,am i n i m a xr e g r e t
statistical treatment rule in the Bernoulli case.
Proposition 5 Let 0 =  [(0)] and let {∈ Γ} be the set of feasible probability distributions
of (1) such that  ((1) −  [(1)])
2  2
,w h e r e2
  0 (1 − 0).L e t (1) be i.i.d.




() ≤  · max
0
[Φ(−)] + (1).
21Maximum regret of binomial average extension ˜  is by design the same as the maximum
regret of the minimax regret treatment rule  in the Bernoulli case. As long as for some ∆  0
Γ contains distributions with all possible means in a ∆-neighborhood of 0
∀ ∈ [0 − ∆ 0 + ∆] ∃ :  [(1)] = ,








0 (1 − 0) · max
0
[Φ(−)]   · max
0
[Φ(−)].
Thus, for large enough , max
∈Γ
(˜ )  sup
∈Γ
(). This underscores the importance of
placing appropriate restrictions on the set of feasible treatment outcome distributions before looking
for minimax regret or asymmetric maximum regret based treatment rules.
5 Evaluating regret using approximations and bounds
In conclusion, I would like to discuss methods for dealing with statistical problems which do not
have neat ﬁnite sample solutions such as described in the previous sections and give an example
illustrating their properties. I will restrict attention to the case when the data consists of  i.i.d.
observations (1) such that  []=,w h e r e ≡  [(1)] −  [(0)] is the average
treatment eﬀect. For many sets of feasible distributions of {}, there aren’t proven complete
class theorems that justify restricting attention to a small class of decision rules. Considering all
feasible statistical treatment rules that are functions of (1) can be prohibitively diﬃcult,
but progress can be made by considering a suitable subset of feasible decision rules. Based on their
suﬃciency in an idealized problem with normally distributed outcomes considered in Section 3, the




¯ based on the sample mean ¯  ≡ 1

P
=1  is a
reasonable and tractable candidate class of statistical treatment rules to consider.





 · ( ¯  ≤ ) if   0,
− · ( ¯  ) if  ≤ 0.
22To evaluate maximum Type I and Type II regret of ,





( ¯  )
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





( ¯  ≤ )
)

the planner needs to know, for each value of , the range of feasible probabilities that the sample
mean ¯  exceeds the threshold .N o t et h a tf o re a c h, ( ¯  ) is a non-increasing function of 
and ( ¯  ≤ ) is non-decreasing. It follows that ¯   () is non-increasing and ¯  ()
is non-decreasing in , thus solutions to minimax regret and asymmetric minimax regret problems
can be easily found if the researcher has a way to evaluate ¯   () and ¯  ().T h e
problem of evaluating 
¡ ¯  Q 
¢
for distributions of  that do not yield a convenient closed-form
expression is well studied in statistics. I will consider three main approaches: brute force calculation
or simulation, normal approximation, and large deviation bounds.
Brute force calculation or simulation The main challenge for calculation or simulation is
in selecting a ﬁnite set of feasible distributions that reliably approximates sup
:=
( ¯  ≤ ) or
sup
:=
( ¯  ) for diﬀerent values of . For some distributions (e.g. for discrete distributions
with small ﬁnite support) such a set is easily constructed by creating a "grid" of distributions
with diﬀerent parameter values. In nonparametric problems, however, it may be diﬃcult to con-
struct a ﬁnite set of distributions that will be certain to reliably approximate sup
:=
( ¯  ≤ ) or
sup
:=
( ¯  ) for each .I fa ni n s u ﬃciently rich set of distributions is chosen, the approximation
will be lower than actual maximum regret.
Normal approximation With the knowledge of  ≡  [] ∈ R and 2
 ≡  [] ∈ R,t h e
planner can use the normal approximation







To evaluate maximum Type I and Type II regret of a threshold decision rule it is suﬃcient to know
minimum and maximum feasible variance 2
 for each feasible value of . Normal approximations
23of tail probabilities of ¯  could be either higher or lower than the actual values, thus approximate
values of maximum Type I/II regret could also be either above or below actual values.
Large deviation bounds There are a number of inequalities for tail probabilities of the distrib-
ution of sample mean ¯ . Using these inequalities allows the statistician to construct ﬁnite sample
upper bounds on maximum Type I and Type II regret. Unlike normal approximations, bounds
constructed using large deviation inequalities are guaranteed not to be lower than actual maximum
Type I/II regret values, which may be useful for conservative decision making.
The simplest large deviation bound is given by the one-sided Chebyshev’s inequality, which
requires only that 0
 have bounded variance:





 ( − )
´2,





 ( − )
´2.
If outcome variables are bounded  ∈ [],t h e nH o e ﬀding’s exponential inequality (1963,
Theorem 2) applies to the tail probabilities of ¯ :


























Hoeﬀding’s inequality was used by Manski (2004) to compute bounds on maximum regret of plug-in
(empirical success) treatment rules.
If a feasible distribution has ﬁnite absolute third moment  ≡  | − |
3 ∈ R, then bounds
on 
¡ ¯  ≤ 
¢
could be derived from the Berry-Esseen inequality:
¯ ¯
¡ ¯  ≤ 
¢
− Φ()


















Lowest proven values for the constants 0 and 1 are 0 ≤ 07975 (van Beek, 1972) and 1 ≤ 32
(Paditz, 1989). For large enough sample sizes, the Berry-Esseen inequality could show that the tail
24probabilities are arbitrarily close to their normal approximation, which is signiﬁcantly smaller than
the Chebyshev’s and Hoeﬀding’s bounds.
5.1 A numerical example
Iw i l li l l u s t r a t eh o wt h ed i ﬀerent methods of evaluating maximum regret of threshold rules may
perform in practice on a simple example inspired by the problem of rare side eﬀects in clinical trials.
Let the average outcome of the status quo treatment  =0be  [(0)] = 5 (outcome values refer
to individual welfare of clinical outcomes). Suppose that a new treatment has been assigned to
 = 1000 randomly selected patients. The treatment has three potential outcomes: (1) = 1 and
(1) = 0 correspond to the positive and negative outcomes of the treatment on the condition that
it is intended to treat, while (1) = −100 corresponds to a rare, dangerous side eﬀect. The set of
feasible treatment outcome distributions Γ includes all probability distributions with the support
{−10001} that have a limited probability of the rare side eﬀect  [(1) = −100] ≤ 1
1000.L e t¯ 
be the sample average of the 1000 trial outcomes of the new treatment.
First, let’s consider how well the diﬀerent methods approximate the regret of a plug-in statistical
treatment rule  ≡ 1
¯ ¯ ¯  5
¯ ¯, which assigns the population to new treatment if it outperforms
the status quo treatment in the trial by any margin. Figure 3 displays the maximum regret of
 for a range of feasible values of the average treatment eﬀect  ≡  [(1)] −  [(0)].T h e r e
are multiple feasible outcome distributions with the same , so the lines represent the maximum
aprroximated regret among those distributions. Figure 4 shows maximum Type I and Type II regret
approximations for threshold decision rules with thresholds ranging from  = 45 to  = 55.T h e
top lines show the best upper bounds on maximum regret derived from large deviation bounds.
That is, the best of the bounds derived from Chebyshev’s, Hoeﬀding’s, or Berry-Esseen inequalities.
Each inequality is applied to all feasible values of distribution moments for a given .C h e b y s h e v ’ s
inequality provides the smallest bounds in this example despite fairly large sample size because
some of the feasible outcome distributions have large range [−1001] and large third moments. It
provides an upper bound of .0508 for both maximum Type I ( ≤ 0)a n dm a x i m u mT y p eI I( 0)
regret.
The lower dotted lines show maximum regret computed using the normal approximation to the


















Figure 3: Evaluation of maximum regret of the plug-in ( = 5) statistical tretment rule.

































Figure 4: Maximum Type I and Type II regret approximations for a range of threshold statistical
treatment rules.
26approximation suggests that both maximum Type I and maximum Type II regret of  equal to
.0173.
The thick solid lines in Figures 3 and 4 show the maximum regret evaluated numerically. The
set of feasible distributions in this problem is simple enough (two-dimensional and continuous)
to be reliably approximated by a ﬁnite set of distributions. For this example, the probabilities

¡ ¯  ≤ 5
¢
and corresponding regret values were evaluated on a grid of 60,000 distributions. These
calculations show that maximum Type I regret of the plug-in rule equals .0262, while the maximum
Type II regret equals .0205. Figure 4 shows that among threshold decision rules, minimax regret
is attained by the decision rule with threshold  = 51 rather than by the plug-in rule, and its
maximum regret equals .0230.
In this example, the large deviation bounds on maximum regret are much higher than its
actual values, while normal approximations are signiﬁcantly lower. Both of them suggest that
the plug-in decision rule minimizes maximum regret, even though its maximum regret is 12%
higher than the minimum attainable by a diﬀerent threshold decision rule. The diﬀerence between
these approximations and actual maximum regret presents a bigger problem for the selection of
trial sample size. Using the normal approximation to evaluate maximum regret could lead the
statistician to choose sample size about 40% smaller than is necessary to make decisions with the
desired maximum regret. Using the large deviation bounds, on the other hand, could lead her to
c h o o s eas a m p l es i z ea l m o s tﬁve times larger than necessary.
Normal approximations and large deviation bounds provide convenient and tractable methods
for evaluating maximum regret of threshold decision rules. This example shows, however, that
even in realistic problems with fairly large sample size, they could signiﬁcantly misrepresent the
maximum regret of decision rules. Whenever possible, such results should be veriﬁed by direct
computation or simulation.
276A p p e n d i x : P r o o f s
Lemma 1 I will prove the results in part a), the proof of part b) is analogous. Note that it is
w.l.o.g. to set  =1to simplify notation, then
¯   () = max
≤0
{−Φ( − )}.
For every ﬁxed 0, −Φ( − ) is a strictly decreasing function of . Furthermore, for
any ﬁxed , −Φ( − ) is a continuous function of  with lim
→−∞
{−Φ( − )} =0 ,a n d
−Φ( − )  0 for −∞ 0,t h u s−Φ( − ) attains its maximum on  ∈ (−∞0).
Therefore max
≤0
{−Φ( − )} is a strictly decreasing function of .
To show that max
≤0
{−Φ( − )} is continuous in  for all  ∈ R,l e t ’ sﬁx  = 0 and pick
some ∆  0. Then there exists 0 such that ( − )  1 and −0 for all and for
all  ∈ [0 − ∆ 0 + ∆].T h e nf o rs u c h and  :






− ( − )
= ( − )
1 − ( − )
 − 
 0.
The second line follows from an well known inequality for the normal distribution:









 {−Φ( − )}  0 for all and all  ∈ [0 − ∆ 0 + ∆],t h em a x i m u mo f
−Φ( − ) over  for each  is achieved on the closed interval  ∈ [0] The derivative of
−Φ( − ) with respect to  is bounded on the rectangle () ∈ [0]×[0 −∆ 0 +∆],t h u s
max
≤0
{−Φ( − )} = max
∈[0]




{−Φ( − )} ≥− Φ(0) = −

2
28(by substituting  = ), thus max
≤0
{−Φ( − )} →∞as  →− ∞ .
For any 0 and 0, Φ( − ) ≤ 1
(−)2 by Chebyshev’s inequality. Also, diﬀerentiation
of − 























4 → 0 thus max
≤0
{−Φ( − )} → 0 as  →∞ .
Proposition 2 a) If 0, then the maximum Type II regret of threshold decision rule  over


































































≥∗ {Φ[∗ − ]}
The third line uses substitutions  ≡
√

¯   and ∗ ≡
√











 (∗ − )
i




 (∗ − )
¤
= Φ[∗ − ] for  ≥
∗. The last equality follows from the condition (7).



























(Φ[∗ − ]) max







≥∗ {Φ[∗ − ]}.
The last equality holds because Φ[∗ − ] ≤ Φ
h
¯ 
 (∗ − )
i
for ∗, thus condition (7) implies
29max
∈(0∗)
(Φ[∗ − ]) ≤ max
≥∗ (Φ[∗ − ]).






































The proof is analogous for Type I regret.
b) Suppose that 0 ¡ ¯ 2¢
has both lower maximum Type I regret and lower maximum Type
II regret than  over the set Γ.S i n c e achieves maximum Type I and II regret over the subset



































Since the class of threshold decision rules is essentially complete for the problem with ﬁxed variance,
there must be a threshold decision rule 0 ≡ 1




≤ (0) for all























which contradicts the conjecture that  is a solution to the minimax regret or asymmetric minimax
regret problem over the feasible set ¯ Γ.T h u s0 cannot have both lower maximum Type I and lower
maximum Type II regret than .
Lemma 3 I will provide the proof for ¯   (), the proof for ¯  () is analogous.
For a ﬁxed ¯ , 
¡¯ 
¢
is a bounded continuous function of  on the closed interval [0],t h u s
30attains its maximum. Also,
|(1) − (2)| ⇒ sup
:∈[0]
|(1) − (2)|  ,
thus max
:∈[0]
() is a continuous function of ().












is a strictly decreasing function of ()= +( 1− ).F o r  =0 , ( ) is also a strictly
decreasing function of () for () ∈ [01] and ( 0) = 0 for () ≥ 1. If follows that
max
:∈[0]
() is a strictly decreasing function of ().
If ()= +1 ,t h e n =  =0 ,t h u s( )=0for any  ∈ (0 0).
Proposition 4 It follows from lemma 3 that maximum regret of the minimax regret treatment
rule lies between maximum Type I and maximum Type II regret of the plug-in treatment rule:
min
















¯  () both converge to max
0
[Φ(−)],t h e ni tf o l -
lows that max
∈Γ




¯  () →
max
0




¯   () is analogous.
To simplify notation, I will use the following substitutions:
 =
q
 (1 − )
0 =
p





















as  →∞ . Since the function Φ(−) reaches its maximum at
31 ≈ 752 and 3
2−2
















































as  →∞ .
Application of the uniform Berry-Esseen inequality to , which is a sum of  independent
Bernoulli random variables with mean  (cf. Shiryaev (1995, p. 63)), yields













¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
≤
2
 +( 1− )
2
p




for any  ∈ R.where Φ is the standard normal c.d.f.






















since 0  0 and
1+0

















































































letting  = −0
































































































































¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ .





















where the last inequality uses substitution  − 0 = 0 √












































Proposition 5 Let  denote the variance of a random variable in state of the world  and let
 ≡  [(1)]. I will consider the case when   0, the proof for  ≤ 0 is analogous.






































Applying the result to the formula for regret of the plug-in rule  yields


































For all  such that  − 0 ≥ 6  √



































Applying the result to the formula for regret of the plug-in rule  yields





































For all  such that  − 0  6  √







, let’s apply the Berry-Esseen
inequality (cf. Shiryaev (1995, p. 374)) to the sum of  i.i.d. random variables ( − ), for any
 ∈ R:
(10)
















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
≤











[(1)] (0 − ) into (10) and it becomes
¯
















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
≤








34Since (1) −  ∈ [01],  |(1) − |














































Applying the result to the regret formula for  yields















































The last inequality uses  − 0  6  √
.
The three cases considered are exhaustive of all states of the world  with   0.I f [(1)] 
2

9 ,o r [(1)] ≥
2

9 and  − 0 ≥ 6  √





  · max
0
[Φ(−)].
If  [(1)] ≥
2

9 and  − 0  6  √
,t h e n
√















[1] Berger, J., 1985. Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis, 2nd ed. Springer Verlag,
New York.
[2] Hayashi, T., 2008. Regret Aversion and Opportunity-Dependence. Journal of Economic Theory
139, 242-268.
[3] Hirano, K., Porter, J., 2009. Asymptotics for Statistical Treatment Rules. Econometrica 77,
1683 - 1701.
[4] International Committee on Harmonization, 1998. Guideline E9: Statistical Principles for
Clinical Trials.
[5] Karlin, S., Rubin, H., 1956. The Theory of Decision Procedures for Distributions with
Monotone Likelihood Ratio. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 27, 272-299.
[6] Manski, C., 2004. Statistical Treatment Rules for Heterogeneous Populations. Econometrica
72, 1221-1246.
[7] Manski, C., 2005. Social Choice with Partial Knowledge of Treatment Response. Princeton
UP.
[8] Manski, C., 2007. Minimax-Regret Treatment Choice with Missing Outcome Data. Journal of
Econometrics 139, 105-115.
[9] Manski, C., 2009. Adaptive Partial Drug Approval. The Economists’ Voice 6, Iss. 4, Art. 9.
[10] Manski, C., Tetenov, A., 2007. Admissible Treatment Rules for a Risk-Averse Planner with
Experimental Data on an Innovation. Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference 137, 1998-
2010.
[11] Milnor, J., 1954. Games Against Nature. In R.M. Thrall, C.H. Coombs, R.L. Davis (eds.):
Decision Processes. Wiley.
[12] Paditz, L., 1989. On the Analytical Structure of the Constant in the Nonuniform Version of
the Esseen Inequality. Statistics 20, 453-464.
36[13] Savage, L., 1951. The Theory of Statistical Decision. Journal of the American Statistical As-
sociation 46, 55-67.
[14] Schlag, K., 2007. Eleven - Designing Randomized Experiments under Minimax Regret. Work-
ing paper, European University Institute.
[15] Shiryaev, A., 1995. Probability (2nd edition). Springer Verlag, New York.
[16] Stoye, J., 2007a. Minimax Regret Treatment Choice with Incomplete Data and Many Treat-
ments. Econometric Theory 23, 190-199.
[17] Stoye, J., 2007b. Minimax Regret Treatment Choice with Finite Samples and Missing Outcome
Data. Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Imprecise Probability, Prague.
[18] Stoye, J., 2009a. Minimax Regret Treatment Choice with Finite Samples. Journal of Econo-
metrics 151, 70-81.
[19] Stoye, J., 2009b. Statistical Decisions under Ambiguity. Working paper, New York University.
[20] van Beek, P., 1972. An Application of Fourier Methods to the Problem of Sharpening the
Berry-Esseen Inequality. Probability Theory and Related Fields 23, 187-196.
[21] Wald, A., 1950. Statistical Decision Functions. Wiley, New York.
37